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Interest of Amicus
Amicus Ernest A. Young is the Alston & Bird Professor at Duke Law
School.1 He teaches and writes in the fields of Federal Courts and
Constitutional Law. He has previously filed amicus briefs in support of the
State of Texas’s standing to challenge the Obama Administration’s
immigration policy in United States v. Texas, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015),
aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). He and a colleague
have recently completed an article considering the role of public law litigation
by state attorneys general in the modern federal system. (A copy of that article,
which will be published in November 2018 and is presently available on
SSRN, has been submitted to this court with an accompanying motion.)
Amicus’s purpose is to support the Commonwealth’s claim to standing in this
case while remaining agnostic as to the merits issues in the case. This brief is
submitted solely in Professor Young’s individual capacity.

1

All parties have consented to the filing of this brief in letters on file with the
Clerk of Court. No counsel for a party has authored this brief in whole or in
part, and no person other than amicus curiae has made any monetary
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
1

Argument
I.

Massachusetts has demonstrated a sufficiently probable concrete
injury in fact to its proprietary interests.
The Commonwealth’s most straightforward basis for standing is that

“the IFRs . . . will inflict an imminent financial injury on Massachusetts.”
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 18. Under the complex of state and federal rules
governing insurance coverage for contraceptives, Massachusetts will end up
having to foot some of the bill if (a) any Massachusetts employers avail
themselves of the opt-outs created by the IFRs, and (b) some of those
employers have female employees of childbearing age who are currently
using affected contraceptive methods. Although the District Court found this
injury too probabilistic to support standing, the Commonwealth’s injury is
sufficient under well-established principles.
A.

The Commonwealth’s injury is not “probabilistic.”

Probabilistic standing problems arise when, as in Clapper v. Amnesty
Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013), it is uncertain whether the plaintiff will
become subject to a challenged government policy.2 In Clapper, the plaintiffs

2

Judgments about probability may also come into play when evaluating
whether a plaintiff’s injury is traceable to the challenged conduct or
redressable by the requested relief. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
2

were attorneys and non-governmental organizations who wished to
communicate with persons abroad who might become subject to surveillance
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. They lacked standing to
challenge the FISA because, among other difficulties, they could not establish
whether the foreign persons they wished to communicate with were actually
being targeted for surveillance; whether (if those persons were targeted) the
surveillance would be conducted pursuant to the challenged FISA provision;
whether (if it were) the FISA court would approve the surveillance; or (if it
did) whether the surveillance would succeed in capturing their
communications. Id. at 411-14. These multiple layers of speculation made
Clapper—to put it mildly—an unusual case.
No uncertainty exists, however, that the new IFRs will become
operative in Massachusetts if not enjoined by the federal courts. Likewise, no
uncertainty exists concerning Massachusetts’ obligations to treat the IFRs as
binding federal law. This obligation alone is sufficient to establish several
concrete injuries in fact. The Commonwealth must alter its own law and
practices to comply with the IFRs. And its preferred policy of access to

757-59 (1984). But the United States has focused its argument in this case on
the prior question of Massachusetts’ concrete injury in fact.
3

contraceptives, embodied in the Access Act, will necessarily be constricted,
particularly with respect to self-insured employer plans covered by ERISA.
To be sure, federal law would bind the Commonwealth in these areas with or
without the new IFRs. But this case—especially the Commonwealth’s
statutory and APA claims—are precisely about the Commonwealth’s right to
have input into the statutory and administrative processes that shape the
content of federal law.
In any event, there is also no probabilistic standing problem with the
Commonwealth’s financial injury. Neither the United States nor the District
Court seriously disputes that some Massachusetts employers will seek
exemptions under the IFRs, that some of their employees will be denied
contraceptive coverage accordingly, or that in some of these cases the
Commonwealth will be called upon to fill the gap. Serious disputes may exist
about the relevant numbers (although Massachusetts relies primarily on the
Departments’ own estimates, see Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 26-32) but
standing to sue has never depended upon the magnitude of the plaintiff’s
injury. See, e.g., Avery v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 312, 316 (D. Mass. 1984)
(“One of the few settled principles of the law of standing is that the magnitude

4

of a party’s injury is irrelevant.”) (citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S.
669, 689 n.14 (1972)).
The District Court hung its hat entirely on Massachusetts’ inability to
identify specific employers who would seek exemptions, or specific
employees who would lose coverage and seek funding from the
Commonwealth. See, e.g., ADD035. Indeed, the District Court went so far as
to identify particular private plaintiffs that were “profoundly absent” from the
case, D.Ct. Op. at 30—as if the fact that another plaintiff might have sued in
itself undermined Massachusetts’ own standing. In any event, the
Commonwealth is not a membership organization that seeks to establish
associational standing by way of showing that a particular member would
have standing based on a specific injury to that member. See, e.g., Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-44 (1977).
Rather, Massachusetts asserts standing based on injury to itself. The
likelihood that Massachusetts employers will seek exemptions under the new
IFRs and that Massachusetts employees will seek contraceptive coverage
through the Commonwealth goes to the likelihood or imminence of the
Commonwealth’s injury. If the fraction of employers eligible to seek
exemption were very, very low, then one might doubt whether the
5

Commonwealth would incur any injury at all. But the Departments’ own
estimates foreclose that conclusion. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 26-32.
And there is no requirement that the Commonwealth identify particular
persons whose actions under the IFRs are going to bring about its injury.
In United States v. Texas, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an
equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016), the Fifth Circuit found that
Texas had standing to challenge the Obama Administration’s Deferred Action
for Parents of Americans (DAPA) policy, which would have increased the
total number of aliens considered to be lawfully present in the United States
by an estimated four million persons. Texas’s standing rested primarily on the
fact that anyone lawfully present in Texas would be eligible to apply for a
Texas driver’s license, and that the state incurred costs of approximately $100
to process each license. See id. at 155. Critically, neither the district court nor
the Fifth Circuit required Texas to show how many persons made lawfully
present under DAPA were in Texas, or how many such persons would apply
for licenses—let alone which particular individuals would do so. See, e.g., id.
at 162 (noting that standing to challenge the overall program was easier to
establish than standing to challenge to individual grants of asylum, because
“it is easier to demonstrate that some DAPA beneficiaries would apply for
6

licenses than it is to establish that a particular alien would”). It was sufficient
that Texas showed a likelihood that a non-trivial number of persons would
apply for licenses, causing Texas to incur non-trivial costs attributable to the
DAPA policy.
The United States’ position here relies on the improbable assumption
that the new IFRs will make no difference, because no one will opt out of the
contraceptive mandate. That, of course, would make it hard to understand why
the Administration undertook such a major revision of the rules.
B.

The U.S.’s “self-inflicted” injury argument lacks any
merit.

In the District Court, the United States suggested that Massachusetts
injury was “self-inflicted” because it arises from the Commonwealth’s policy
choice to provide reimbursement where federal law does not. See
Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion to Dismiss at 12-13.
But there is simply no such thing as a “self-inflicted injury” rule of the sort
that the United States invokes.
The United States’ argument rests entirely on Pennsylvania v. New
Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976) (per curiam). That case considered two separate
motions for leave to file complaints in the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction concerning taxation by one state that allegedly injured other
7

states. The Court said—entirely without explanation—that “[n]o State can be
heard to complain about damage inflicted by its own hand.” Id. at 664. But
the Court did not describe this as a rule of “standing.”3 Pennsylvania’s
discussion is best read as not concerning Article III standing at all, but rather
as an application of the Supreme Court’s standard for exercising its original
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 76 (1992)
(“Recognizing the delicate and grave character of our original jurisdiction, we
have interpreted the Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) as making our
original jurisdiction obligatory only in appropriate cases, and as providing us
with substantial discretion to make case-by-case judgments as to the practical
necessity of an original forum in this Court.”) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). One criterion for the exercise of jurisdiction is that “it must
appear that the complaining State has suffered a wrong through the action of
the other State,” Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 15 (1939), and it is
evidently this requirement that concerned the Court in Pennsylvania. The

3

The only use of the term “standing” in the opinion occurs in the Court’s later
discussion of Pennsylvania’s additional parens patriae claim on behalf of its
citizens. See 426 U.S. at 665. The Court rejected that claim based on other
grounds having nothing to do with self-inflicted injury.
8

original jurisdiction cases do not invoke Article III and there is no reason to
believe that the standards are the same.4
In any event, the novel requirement proposed by the United States would
have radical implications for standing doctrine. Most injuries can be avoided
by some action or other. Certainly the justiciability rules do not categorically
require the States to take evasive action at all costs to avoid injury at the hands
of federal law. When a state law has been held invalid on federal constitutional
grounds, for example, the state has standing to appeal that judgment based on
the injury that inheres in not being able to enforce its law;5 no one says that
this injury is “self-inflicted” because the state did not have to enact its law in
the first place. Massachusetts was not required here to alter its legal regime to
accommodate a change in federal law that injured it, without first having the
opportunity to challenge the validity of that federal change. See, e.g., Alfred

4

See also Richard D. Freer & Edward H. Cooper, 13B Federal Practice &
Procedure § 3531.11.1 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database updated April 2015) (“The
special concerns that have guided the Court in this area [original jurisdiction]
are unique to its own jurisdictional problems, and do not provide a sure basis
for analogous reasoning in other areas of state standing.”).
5

See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986) (permitting a state
government intervenor to appeal a judgment invalidating a state law because
“a State clearly has a legitimate interest in the continued enforceability of its
own statutes”).
9

L. Snapp & Sons, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982)
(recognizing a State’s “sovereign interest” in “the power to create and enforce
a legal code”).
C.

The Massachusetts Access Act demonstrates, rather
than undermines, the Commonwealth’s standing in
this case.

The Departments’ own estimates confirm that many employers will
seek exemptions under the IFRs, and that many women will be forced to look
elsewhere for contraceptive coverage. The only reason given by the District
Court for rejecting the Commonwealth’s argument that it would be
proportionately affected was the passage of Massachusetts’ ACCESS Act
which “requires essentially the same coverage as the ACA mandate.”
ADD025. That Court concluded that “[i]t is clear that, given the new ACCESS
Act, Massachusetts will be affected differently by the IFRs than other states
but it is not at all clear how the coverage of the Access Act will impact
employers who may have intended to utilize the expanded exemptions.”
ADD027. That much is no doubt true. But the District Court erred when it
leaped from the observation that “the ACCESS Act affects the ‘metes and
bounds’ of the Commonwealth’s injury”—which the Court conceded was
“irrelevant”—to

a decision to

discount
10

“the likelihood that the

Commonwealth will be injured” at all. Id. After all, the magnitude of the
plaintiff’s injury is irrelevant to standing. And no one claimed below that the
ACCESS Act would eliminate the IFRs’ impact altogether.
Even if the Access Act did ensure that every employer who seeks an
exemption under the IFRs would nonetheless be bound to provide
contraceptive coverage under the ACCESS Act, the IFRs would nonetheless
have transformed the legal regime in ways that injure the Commonwealth.
Specifically, the IFRs would still have shifted responsibility for enforcement
of the contraceptive mandate from federal to state authorities. The costs of
enforcing that state mandate, in terms of budgetary outlays, diversion of
enforcement officials from other priorities, and even political backlash, would
count as injury attributable to the federal IFRs.6
This point simply underscores that a state does not undermine its own
standing to challenge a federal law by passing a state law seeking to mitigate

6

Nor does the temporal sequence matter. To the extent that the
Commonwealth suggests that Massachusetts employers were already subject
to a contraceptive mandate prior to the ACA under the 2002 Contraceptive
Equity Law, Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 43, the ACA and its accompanying
rules would have eased that enforcement burden. The re-allocation of
enforcement costs to the Commonwealth as a result of the new IFRs would
still constitute an injury.
11

its injury. Massachusetts has made a judgment that its ultimate costs will be
lessened by deploying its own resources to enforce broader access to
contraceptives than by leaving a broad class of employers without coverage
obligations. But if an unlawful change in federal policy has made this step
necessary, that imposed necessity is itself an injury supporting standing.7
D.

Arguments about the speculative nature of the
Commonwealth’s injury raise questions of ripeness,
not standing.

To the extent that Massachusetts’ injuries are thought to be prospective
and uncertain, that concern goes to the timing of judicial review rather than to
its appropriateness. Any uncertainties, in other words, arise from the fact that
Massachusetts seeks pre-enforcement review of the IFRs. The availability of
such review is governed by the ripeness framework established in Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). That framework assesses “the
fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration.” Id. at 149. Under that framework, judicial
review is plainly appropriate here.

7

Neither party has argued that the IFRs preempt the Access Act or similar
statutes. If they did, then the Commonwealth would plainly have standing to
challenge them.
12

As

in

Abbott

Laboratories,

the

Commonwealth

challenges

administrative action as not only procedurally flawed but inconsistent with the
underlying statutory mandate. This is a “purely legal” question that can be
resolved by recourse to the underlying statute and precedents about the scope
of executive enforcement discretion; it does not turn on factual suppositions
about events yet to occur. And the hardship of denying pre-enforcement
review arises from the difficulty and potential unfairness and complexity
involved in unwinding grants of exemptions once they have been made
pursuant to the challenged IFRs. This case is ripe for review, and the United
States cannot evade that conclusion by repackaging its argument as one of
standing.
II.

Massachusetts has parens patriae standing.
A State has an acknowledged “set of interests . . . in the well being of

its populace.” Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602. Snapp recognized two kinds of “quasisovereign” interests sufficient to support Article III standing: “First, a State
has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being-both physical and
economic-of its residents in general. Second, a State has a quasi-sovereign
interest in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the

13

federal system.” Id. at 607. Massachusetts has both sorts of interests at stake
in this case.
A.

This case implicates Massachusetts’ quasi-sovereign
interest in its citizens’ welfare.

The Commonwealth’s most obvious quasi-sovereign interest is simply
the harm to Massachusetts citizens who will lose contraceptive coverage
under the new IFRs. The District Court misunderstood this interest by treating
it as identical to Massachusetts’ proprietary interests in avoiding becoming
responsible for contraceptive coverage in the absence of federal coverage.
When asserting its quasi-sovereign interest in its citizens’ well-being,
Massachusetts need not show that any costs will be passed through to the
Commonwealth; for the same reason, there is no ground to argue that the harm
to Massachusetts citizens, as opposed to the Commonwealth itself, is “selfinflicted.”
Moreover, Snapp makes clear that the substantiality of a state’s interest
is measured not quantitatively but rather from the standpoint of the state’s own
policy priorities. Hence, “[o]ne helpful indication in determining whether an
alleged injury to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State
standing to sue as parens patriae is whether the injury is one that the State, if
it could, would likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking
14

powers.” 458 U.S. at 607. The Commonwealth has addressed the issue of
contraceptive coverage in employer health plans through its Contraceptive
Equity Law in 2002 and in the more recent ACCESS Act. See Massachusetts
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519-20 (2007) (holding that Massachusetts’ quasisovereign interests were implicated where federal law partially preempted the
Commonwealth’s ability to protect its citizens directly). These examples of
Massachusetts’ concern with contraceptive access meet the central purpose of
Snapp’s test, which is to confine quasi-sovereign interests to areas of state
legislative policy interest—as opposed to cases in which the state is a
“nominal party.” 458 U.S. at 607 (“[T]he State must articulate an interest apart
from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State must be more than
a nominal party.”). The quantitative standard applied by the District Court, by
contrast, invites federal courts to sit in judgment of state policy priorities.
The District Court held that “Plaintiff’s quasi-sovereign interest theory
of standing is wanting for the same reason as its financial harm theory”—that
is, the failure to “identify any particular woman who is likely to lose
contraceptive coverage” or “any Massachusetts employer” likely to seek an
exemption. ADD039. This was error. In effect, the District Court treated the
Commonwealth as if it were a membership organization asserting
15

associational standing. A membership association, like the Sierra Club, would
be obliged to identify at least one particular member who would have
standing, and thus to show a concrete injury in fact to a particular person. See
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738-40 (1972). But states have a quite
different obligation. The parens patriae doctrine requires them “articulate an
interest apart from the interests of particular private parties.” See Snapp, 458
U.S. at 607 (emphasis added). No authority holds that states must both
articulate their own quasi-sovereign interest and identify particular citizens
who are harmed. See, e.g., id. (“[A] State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the
health and well-being-both physical and economic-of its residents in
general.”). Given Massachusetts v. EPA’s statement that states are entitled to
“special solicitude” in the standing analysis, 549 U.S. at 520, the District
Court was wrong to set the standing bar higher for state governments than for
private associations.
B.

Massachusetts also has a quasi-sovereign interest in its
equal participation in the federal system

Snapp recognized a quasi-sovereign interest in “a quasi-sovereign
interest in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the
federal system.” 458 U.S. at 607. This is not simply an interest in being
denied, say, sovereign rights protected by the “equal footing” doctrine.
16

Rather, it includes “securing observance of the terms under which [the state]
participates in the federal system.” Id. at 607-08. Ever since the New Deal,
those terms have been cooperative—that is, the old “dual federalism” regime
of separate state and federal spheres has been replaced by cooperative
federalism structures in which state governments pervasively participate in
the implementation of federal law.8 Even where states play no direct
enforcement role, the operation of state law is typically structured around, and
crucially affected by, the operation of federal legal regimes.9 Because states
no longer enjoy significant zones of exclusive regulatory authority, and
because they are intimately involved in the federal regulatory process, some
of the most important “terms under which the state participates in the federal

8

See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 663, 665 (2001); Morton Grodzins,
The American Federal System, in A Nation of States: Essays on the American
Federal System 1-2 (Robert A. Goldwin, ed., 1961).
9

Cf. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at 163 (holding that Texas fell within
the zone of interests of the Immigration & Naturalization Act because
“Texas seeks to participate in notice and comment before the Secretary
changes the immigration classification of millions of illegal aliens in a way
that forces the state to the Hobson's choice of spending millions of dollars to
subsidize driver's licenses or changing its statutes.”).
17

system” involve the states’ opportunities to participate in debates about
federal policy.
Most obviously, states participate in federal policy debates through
their congressional representatives.10 The trouble is that, as Justice White
observed 35 year ago, “[f]or some time, the sheer amount of law . . . made by
the agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in by Congress
through the traditional process.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985-86 (1983)
(White, J., dissenting). That law, however, is legitimate only to the extent that
it can be tied back to some decision by Congress.11 This is so not only because
the agencies lack any constitutionally-conferred lawmaking power of their
own, but—more importantly from the states’ perspective—congressional
deliberation remains the primary arena in which they are represented. Hence,
it is critical that states remain able to assert precisely the sort of statutory claim
that Massachusetts asserts here: that the agency has exceeded the scope of its

10

See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 55054 (1985); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954).
11

See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net
Down: Administrative Federalism without Congress, 57 Duke L.J. 2111,
2130-41 (2008).
18

mandate under the law that Congress wrote.12 Without this safeguard, states
would be critically “excluded from the benefits that are to flow from
participation in the federal system.” Snapp, 458 U.S. at 608.
Substantive review under the Administrative Procedure Act, however,
is an incomplete protection for states in contemporary American
policymaking. Given the broad terms of modern federal statutes, the most
important “legislative” battles involve the sorts of rulemaking proceedings at
issue here. In that setting, the APA’s notice and comment requirement—as
well as the opportunity to sue when that right is denied—affords state
governments their own independent voice in federal policymaking analogous
to their constitutionally-mandated representation in national legislation. As
Daniel Francis has observed, this “independence of voice may be particularly
useful when the levels of government exhibit significant interdependence of
action. In modern America, state institutions and officials are deeply
enmeshed in federal programs: state officials administer federal programs,
enforce federal law, and interpret federal norms, formally subject in all cases

12

See generally Comment, State Standing to Challenge Federal
Administrative Action: A Re-Examination of the Parens Patriae Doctrine, 125
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1069, 1094-1103 (1977).
19

to federal decision-makers.”13 Given the cooperative structure of most federal
regulatory programs, it would be difficult to identify any class of entities more
pervasively enmeshed in and affected by changes in federal regulations than
state governments. States must have a voice in that process before rules
become finalized.
C.

Massachusetts v. Mellon
Commonwealth’s suit.

does

not

bar

the

Below, the United States argued for a categorical rule that “a State
cannot sue the federal government ‘to protect citizens of the United States
from the operation’ of federal law.” Memorandum in Support of Defendants’
Cross-Motion to Dismiss at 13 (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447, 485 (1923)). The District Court wisely did not rely on this construction
of Mellon. That decision does not apply to this case by its own terms, and the
Supreme Court narrowed it considerably in Massachusetts v. EPA.

13

Daniel Francis, Litigation as a Political Safeguard of Federalism, 49 Ariz.
St. L. J. 1023, 1050 (2017). Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and
Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health
Reform and Beyond, 121 Yale L.J. 534, 536 (2011) (“[E]very branch of state
government is squarely in the midst of creating, implementing, and
interpreting federal statutory law.”).
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First, Mellon involved parens patriae suits based on the welfare of a
state’s citizens. See id. at 485-86. In such situations, the United States can
plausibly claim that it likewise has a parens patriae interest; American
citizens, after all, are citizens of both the state and the nation. But as discussed
in Section B, supra, this case also implicates the Commonwealth’s interest in
equal participation in the federal system. The United States has never claimed
the exclusive right to vindicate that interest, and Mellon did not discuss it.
Second, the Massachusetts v. EPA Court read Mellon far more narrowly
than does the United States. Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in Massachusetts
v. EPA cited Mellon for the proposition that “our cases cast significant doubt
on a State’s standing to assert a quasi-sovereign interest . . . against the Federal
Government.” 549 U.S. at 539 (Roberts, CJ, dissenting) (citing Mellon, 262
U.S. at 485-86). “Not so,” responded Justice Stevens for the majority:
Mellon itself disavowed any such broad reading when it noted
that the Court had been “called upon to adjudicate, not rights of
person or property, not rights of dominion over physical domain,
[and] not quasi-sovereign rights actually invaded or threatened.”
262 U.S., at 484–485 (emphasis added). In any event, we held
in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945),
that there is a critical difference between allowing a State “to
protect her citizens from the operation of federal statutes” (which
is what Mellon prohibits) and allowing a State to assert its rights
under federal law (which it has standing to do). 549 U.S. at 520
n. 17.
21

As in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Commonwealth “does not here dispute that
[the ACA or the APA] applies to its citizens; it rather seeks to assert its rights
under the Act[s].” Id. Specifically, Massachusetts argues that the new IFRs
injure its citizens by denying them coverage guaranteed by the ACA, and that
implementing those IFRs without notice and comment denies the
Commonwealth’s right to participate in federal rulemaking under the APA.
Hence both Massachusetts’ quasi-sovereign interests—its interest in
participating in the federal system and its interest in protecting its citizens’
welfare—provide valid and independent bases for parens patriae standing
here. To the extent that the Government reads Mellon for a more restrictive
rule, that reading did not survive Massachusetts v. EPA.
The Court’s construction of parens patriae standing in Massachusetts
v. EPA confers broad standing on states to vindicate rights under federal law.
That reading is far more consistent with the design of our federal system than
the Government’s over-reading of Mellon. Two bedrock elements of that
system are relevant here: the dual capacity of American citizenship and the
basic integration of state and federal law. As Justice Kennedy pointed out in
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, “[t]he Framers split the atom of
sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two
22

political capacities, one state and one federal. . . .” 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Alexander Hamilton explained how these
capacities facilitate individual liberty in Federalist 28:
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general
government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations
of the state governments, and these will have the same
disposition towards the general government. The people, by
throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it
preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make
use of the other as the instrument of redress. Federalist No. 28,
at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (italics
added).
To say that only the national government may protect citizens from violations
of national law, as the United States suggests, would turn this dynamic on its
head.
The integration of federal and state law confirms this conclusion. In
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), for example, the Court rejected the notion
that Rhode Island courts could refuse to hear a federal claim because the
federal statute was contrary to state public policy. Quoting an earlier case
arising in Connecticut, the Court insisted that
When Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by
the Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and
all the states, and thereby established a policy for all. That policy
is as much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had emanated
from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in
23

the courts of the state. 330 U.S. at 392 (quoting Mondou v.New
York, N.H. &H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912)).
Testa illustrates that “‘[t]he laws of the United States are laws in the several
States, and just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the State
laws are.... The two together form one system of jurisprudence, which
constitutes the law of the land for the State.’” Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455,
469-70 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Claflin v.
Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1876)). That means, on the one hand, that
the state courts must be open to federal claims. But it also means that rights
under federal law are not somehow alien or beyond the states’ purview.
Rather, as Massachusetts v. EPA confirmed, they are appropriately enforced
by state governments when violations of federal law implicate a state’s quasisovereign interests.
III.

Massachusetts has standing to raise its Religious Establishment
and Equal Protection claims.
The District Court did not separately address the Commonwealth’s

standing to pursue claims that the IFRs violate the Establishment Clause or
the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. But the United States has, albeit in passing, challenged
Massachusetts’ standing to raise any claim under those provisions. See
24

Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion to Dismiss at 10 n. 5.
These provisions do raise distinct issues that deserve separate attention. But if
anything, the Commonwealth’s constitutional claims offer an even more
direct path to standing than its statutory ones do.
Massachusetts has alleged that the IFRs violate the Establishment
Clause because they give a preferred position to religious belief, and that they
deny equal protection of the laws by imposing burdens uniquely on women.
See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 33-40.
Both these claims implicate the Commonwealth’s quasi-sovereign interest in
the welfare of its citizens, and hence they are appropriate instances of parens
patriae standing.14 Nothing turns, as the Government suggested below, on
whether a state is the sort of entity that can experience “spiritual” harm.
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These claims do come closer to the circumstances of Massachusetts v.
Mellon than do the Commonwealth’s statutory claims. Mellon rejected a
Tenth Amendment challenge to a federal appropriations measure creating a
conditional spending regime meant to encourage states to protect maternal
health. See 262 U.S. at 479. The result was over-determined: the Court
suggested variously, without much explanation, that the challenge was invalid
on the merits because the law involved the offer of a benefit rather than the
imposition of an obligation, see id. at 480, 482, that it was a nonjusticiable
political question, see id. at 481, 483-85, and that Massachusetts lacked
standing to sue parens patriae. But Massachusetts v. EPA denied any broad
reading of Mellon’s principle. See supra Section II.C. Moreover, Mellon
declined “to say that a state may never intervene by suit to protect its citizens
25

Importantly, neither the establishment nor the equal protection claim
depends on whether any Massachusetts employers avail themselves of their
option under the new IFRs. The Commonwealth claims that the IFRs
“endorse” religion simply by creating this broad option and making it
available only to religious objectors. See id. at 35. That violation—and
whatever injury a reasonable observer would feel as a result—occurs as soon
as the policy goes into effect.
Likewise, the Commonwealth’s equal protection theory is that the legal
regime created by the IFRs, which fails to guarantee contraceptive access to
women, inherently fails to provide the “equal protection of the laws.” If a
state’s law forbidding assault criminalized only attacks on men, that law
would be recognized as a denial of equal protection whether or not any woman
were actually assaulted. Here too, the constitutional violation as framed in
Massachusetts’ lawsuit is complete when the IFRs go into effect. See id. at 38.

against any form of enforcement of unconstitutional acts of Congress,” 262
U.S. at 485, and the effort in Mellon to assert citizens’ welfare under the Tenth
Amendment raises quite different questions than a state’s parens patriae
enforcement of individual rights provisions like the First and Fifth
Amendments. In any event, Mellon’s suggestion that the national government
is the judge of its own constitutional power is inconsistent with much
contemporary jurisprudence and should not be read expansively.
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Amici take no position on whether either of these constitutional theories is
valid on the merits; for jurisdictional purposes, however, the question is
whether the plaintiff has standing to raise the claim that it has pled.
IV.

States have a legitimate role to play in challenging unlawful federal
policies because they provide an effective mechanism for
vindicating diffuse interests.
Massachusetts v. EPA’s “special solicitude” for States’ standing makes

sound functional sense, because States will often be uniquely appropriate
litigants for bringing certain sorts of claims. One of the most difficult
problems in federal practice and procedure concerns the appropriate
mechanisms for aggregating claims that affect large numbers of people but
that individual litigants lack the incentives or the wherewithal to pursue.15 Our
law has adopted a number of solutions—such as class actions or
organizational standing—as means of aggregating claims that are
impracticable to bring on an individual basis. But these mechanisms all have
their problems, and none addresses the lack of individual standing when
injuries occur to diffuse public interests. States, however, are empowered by
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See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public Law
Litigation in an Age of Polarization, 97 Tex. L. Rev. __ [draft at 50-56]
(forthcoming Nov. 2018).
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state constitutions and the Tenth Amendment to represent the diffuse public
interest of their citizens.
One significant advantage that States have over private organizations
and class actions is that they have built-in mechanisms of democratic
accountability for their conduct of litigation on behalf of their citizens.16
Justices of the Supreme Court have complained that the use of “private
attorneys general” to enforce federal law raises significant problems of public
accountability, and similar concerns have been raised about the accountability
of class counsel in class actions.17 State officials who sue on behalf of their
citizens are politically accountable for their actions, however. A recent reelection campaign by the Texas Attorney General, for example, featured
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See, e.g., Lemos & Young, supra, at 56-60; Bradford Mank, Should States
Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v.
EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1701, 1784
(2008) (discussing checks on state litigation).
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See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 36 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing private attorneys general); In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank
Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 788 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting concern about lack
of accountability of class counsel).
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public debate about the appropriateness of the State’s participation in
litigation challenging the Affordable Care Act.18
More generally, litigation by States fits well into a constitutional system
predicated on the notion that no one person or institution can lay a unique
claim to the public interest. Our system of both vertical and horizontal checks
and balances recognizes that the public benefits when multiple institutions can
step in if a particular officer or agency fails to pursue the public welfare or
respect legal constraints. Even in an area of strong national interest like
climate change, immigration, or healthcare, the national Executive is not, and
cannot be, judge in its own case. By according “special solicitude” to States’
standing, Massachusetts v. EPA facilitated States’ valuable role in the process
by which every political institution is held accountable to the rule of law.
Conclusion
The decision of the District Court that Massachusetts lacks standing to
pursue its claims in this case should be reversed.
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See Chuck Lindell, Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott Opposes Federal
Government on Many Fronts, Austin American-Statesman, Aug. 7, 2010,
available at http://www.statesman.com/news/texaspolitics/texas-attorneygeneral-greg-abbott-opposes-federal-government847623.html?printArticle=y.
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